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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. JERRY FIV AS and ALAIRE J. 
FIVAS, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
JOSEPH F. PETERSEN and 
FLORENCE E. PETERSEN, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Civil No. 8470 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment in a suit to quiet 
title wherein the plaintiffs relied upon a sale for taxes 
for the year 1949 and particularly upon an auditor's tax 
deed issued after the ~fay sale in 1954. At the ti1ne of 
trial the plaintiffs introduced in evidence the original 
auditor's deed (Ex. 1) and a copy of the tax sale record 
certified by the official custodian of the record at thA 
time of the certificate under the seal of his office, (Ex. 
2) making a prima facie case pursuant to Section 59-10-
36, U.C.A. 1953. 
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2 
The burden then shifted to the defendants, who had 
filed an Answer generally denying title in the plaintiffs, 
to prove the title in the plaintiffs as derived from the tax 
sale as defective and invalid. The defendants introduced 
no evidence, and it was stipulated that all answers to 
interrogatories .and requests for admissions of fact as 
filed by both parties should be admitted. Judgment was 
given by the trial court in favor of plaintiffs. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
On the record as made in the trial court the defend-
ants in the trial court, as now on .appeal, argued for in-
validity of the tax sale on the four points as set forth 
in Appellants' Brief. Respondents now reply to these 
arguments in the same order and present the following 
points to the court for consideration: 
POINT I. 
FAILURE OF THE TAXPAYER TO RECEIVE TAX 
NOTICES DID NOT INVALIDATE THE TAX SALE, AS 
THE BURDEN IS ON THE TAXPAYER TO PROTECT HIS 
PROPERTY FROM TAX SALE BY DETERMINING AND 
PAYING HIS TAXES. 
POINT II. 
THE TAX DEED RECITES A SUFFICIENT ·CONSID-
ERATION IN COMPLIANCE WITH PARAGRAPH (5') OF 
SEC. 59-10-64, U.C.A. 1953, WHICH IS BY ITS TERMS DI-
RECTORY AND WHI·CH MUST BE SO CONSTRUED TO 
GIVE REASON AND EFFECT TO THE OTHER PARA-
GRAPHS OF THE SAME SECTION. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
POINT III. 
THE NOTI·CE PUBLISHED WITH THE DELINQUENT 
LIST CONTAINED NO EXCESSIVE DEMAND WHICH 
WOULD INVALIDATE THE SALE. 
POINT IV. 
THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER OF TENDER HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO THIS SITUATION. WAIVER OF TENDER 
REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
FAILURE OF THE TAXPAYER TO RECEIVE TAX 
NOTICES DID NOT INVALIDATE THE TAX SALE, AS 
THE BURDEN IS ON THE ·TAXPAYER TO PROTECT HIS 
PROPERTY FROM TAX SALE BY DETERMINING AND 
PAYING HIS TAXES. 
Appellants have argued that both the notice of valua-
tion and the tax notice were invalid and improper as they 
were not mailed by the County Treasurer and further 
that the tax sale was invalidated as the County Assessor 
did not have on the tax rolls any address for the tax-
payer from which the treasurer could obtain his mailing 
address. 
Appellants relied for authority upon Jungk v. 
Snyder, 28 Utah 1, 78 P. 168 (1904). That case involved 
the validity of a tax notice on a mining claim, wherein 
the notice showed the owners as "unknown", and the 
notice was actually mailed to "Ophir, Unknown, Henrietta 
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claim." The parties attacking the tax sale showed that 
the assessor had made no attempts to locate and identify 
the owners and their addresses .and that the property 
was assessed in the nmne of the claim, with the notation 
"owners unknown." The applicable law was Section 43 
of the Revenue Act of 1896 (Sess. Laws 1896, P. 435, c. 
129) which provided specifically and spelled out that the 
assessor should determine so far as possible the names 
of the owners and their addresses from "taxpayers' 
statements, county records, or otherwise." The section 
construed in the Jungk case is not in the law today 
and was succeeded by Sec. 5912 R.S. 1898 and C. L. 1907 
and Sec. 2610, R.S. 1898, now both carried after many 
amendments into present Sections 59-10-9 and 59-10-10, 
U.C.A. 1953, which generally provide for the mailing of 
valuation and tax notices by the County Treasurer. By 
the amendments to the old laws the entire theory of the 
law of taxation has been changed with the burden being 
placed upon the taxpayer instead of the county officials 
to see that the taxpayer ultimately receives notices re-
garding his property. This is both logical and reason-
able in view of the increase in population and the in-
crease in number of separate assessed parcels of prop-
erty. The time has passed when the county officials 
should be expected to know personally any great number 
of taxpayers or should be expected to conduct intensive 
investigation to identify, locate and personally contact 
taxpayers. 
The change·s in the applicable law have kept pace 
with the practical population changes. Section 59-10-9, 
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U.C.A. 1953, now provides regarding the valuation notice 
as follows: 
"The county treasurer shall furnish to each 
taxpayer by mail to the address noted on the as-
sessment book, postage prepaid, or leave at his 
residence or usual place of business, if known) a 
notice of the kind and valuation of property as-
sessed to him, also notice of the days fixed by 
the county board of equalization for hearing com-
plaints." (Italics ours.) 
Section 59-10-10, U.C.A. 1953, provides regarding the 
tax notice from the treasurer as follows: 
"He shall proceed to collect taxes and shall 
furnish to each taxpayer, except car companies 
and the owners of automobiles, motor stages, 
motor transports, and trailers employed in com-
mon-c.arrier business, by mail, postage prepaid, 
or leave at his residence or usual place of business, 
if known) a notice of the amount of tax assessed 
against him, which shall set out the aggregate 
amount of taxes to be paid, for state, county, city, 
town and school purposes, etc." (Italics ours.) 
. 
We stress the inclusion in e.ach section of the phrase 
"if known," which we submit must reasonably mean if 
kno-vvn to the County Treasurer, either through personal 
knowledge or sources of information available in his own 
office and in regard to the property taxed. 
The Washington Supreme Court in Spokane County 
v. Glover) 2 Wash. 2d 162, 97 P. 2d 628 (1940), decided 
that "the proceeding to assess and collect taxes upon real 
property was a proceeding in rem; that the owner of 
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6 
property is chargeable with knowledge of every step in 
the tax procedure; and that statutory provisions with 
regard to owners are directory rather than mandatory." 
The Glover case involved a que,stion as to whether the 
County Treasurer should go outside his office and use 
every possible means to locate taxpayers, in fact conduct-
ing a fugitive hunt for them, or whether a duty was on 
the taxpayer to keep the treasurer informed as to his 
whereabouts. The court stated that the policy should 
reasonably be that "which charges the owner of property 
with knowledge of the fact that his property is taxable 
every year" and that the "legislature did not intend to 
ineffectuate the entire taxing system by making the 
owner's duty to pay taxes conditional upon the sending 
of a notice by the treasurer." The Glover case contains a 
full discussion of the difficulties that would face the 
treasurer if by necessity he had the burden of locating 
all taxpayers. 
S1dter v. Sc1tdder, 110 niont. 390, 103 P. 2d 303, 306 
(1940) gives a statement of general policy in the follo,v-
ing language : 
"It is incumbent upon a property owner to take 
notice of the known fact that all property is taxed 
annually, and unless the taxes are paid that the 
property will be sold at tax sale," and cites 61 
C.J. 565; Detroit Life Ins. Co. v. Fuller, (Mich.) 
199 N.W. 699; McGuire v. Bean, 151 Wash. 474, 
276 P. 555. 
Appellants have argued that failure to get a tax no-
tice to the taxpayers involved ultimately taking their 
property without due process. 
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In Pender v. Ebey, 194 Okla. 407, 152 P. 2d 268 
(1944) the court stated that: 
'I 
"* * * generally, every person is charged 
with knowledge as to whether his taxes are paid, 
and if they are not paid he is charged with knowl-
edge that the land may be sold in the manner pro-
vided by law, and owner is charged with notice of 
the time and place where such sales are required 
to be made." See also N. H. Ranch Co. v. Gann, 
42 N.M. 530, 82 P. 2d 632; Jones v. Mills County 
(Iowa) 279 N.W. 96; Selzer v. Baker, (N.Y.) 65 
N.E. 2d 752 (1945). 
We submit that there can be no lack of due process 
when the burden is actually on the taxpayer to protect 
his property and to see that his taxes are paid. 
The record in the instant case shows through the 
admissions of the defendants in the negative that they 
did not make any inquiry of the county assessor or county 
treasurer as to why tax notices were not received, where 
the tax notices were, or what the taxes amounted to. (R. 
29) .. __ Appellants answered in the negative Respondents' 
Interrogatory No. 25 which was: "If no tax notices for 
the years 1948 and subsequent years covering said prop-
erty were received by you, did you ever contact Barnes 
Banking Company or Horace J. Knowlton or Elsie M. 
Knowlton to make inquiry regarding said tax notices 
or the taxes due upon s.aid property~" (R. 22). The 
record reveals that Barnes Banking Company had a mort-
gage upon said property, and the Knowltons were the 
grantors of appellants. (R. 22, 24). 
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We submit that the logic of the cases cited above, 
which hold that the taxpayer is charged with knowledg~ 
of his property being subject to tax and with the burden 
of seeing that the taxes are paid, should control. This 
burden on the taxpayer necessarily imposes on him the 
duty of supplying the treasurer with a current address 
and of checking with the treasurer as to why any tax 
notice is not received if a tax may be assumed to be due. 
We submit that the present statutes, Section 59-10-9 and 
Section 59-10-10, U.C.A. 1953, are a legislative pro-
nouncement of a change of policy supporting the practical 
doctrine of the Glover case, supra, and abandoning the 
unworkable theory of our old statutes and the Jungk 
case, supra. 
POINT II. 
THE TAX DEED RECITES A SUFFICIENT .CONSID-
ERATION IN COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 59-10-64 (5) WHICH 
IS BY ITS TERMS DIRECTORY. 
The appellants have referred to Section 59-10-64, 
U.C.A. 1953, in arguing that the tax deed issued by the 
County Auditor to the respondents on }fay 13, 1954 was 
void on its face because the consideration as recited was 
not that actually paid. 
The statute provides in paragraph ( 5), which also 
sets out the form of the deed, as follows: (italics ours) 
"59-10-64. ( 5) The County auditor is au-
thorized in the name of the countY to execute deeds 
conveying in fee simple all property sold at said 
public sale to the purchaser and to attest the same 
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9 
with his seal. Deeds issued by the county auditor 
in pursuance of this section or of section 59-10-61 
shall recite the total amount of .all the delinquent 
taxes, penalties, interest and costs which were paid 
in for· the execution and delivery of the deed, the 
year for which the property was assessed and 
sold to the county at preliminary sale, a full de-
scription of the property and the name of the 
grantee, .and when executed and delivered by the 
auditor shall be prima facie evidence of all pro~ 
ceedings subsequent to the preliminary sale and of 
the conveyance of the property to the grantee in 
fee simple. A copy of deeds issued by the county 
auditor in pursuance of this section and section 
59-10-61 shall be promptly sent to the state land 
board. 
The deed may be substantially in the follow-
ing form: 
TAX DEED 
--------------------------------------------------------County, a body 
corporate and (politic) of the State of Utah, 
grantor, hereby conveys to ________________________________________ , 
grantee, of ---------------------------------------- the following described real estate in _______________________________________________ _ 
County, Utah: 
(Here describe the property conveyed) 
This conveyance is made in consideration of 
payment by the grantee of the sum of $----------------
delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs con-
stituting .a charge against said real estate, which 
was sold to said county at preliminary sale for 
nonpayment of general taxes assessed against it 
for the year 19 ________ in the sum of $------------------------· 
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Dated this ---------------- day of ____________________________ , 




According to this statute the county auditor "is au-
thorized" to give a deed as set out .above. "Authorized" 
is a word that has very generally been construed by the 
courts to imply permissive use of discretion. See Creek 
Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 629, 87 L. Ed. 1046; 
State v. Laven, (Wis.) 71 N.W. 2d 287. 
The statute provides the form for the tax deed, and 
it is specific in providing that the deed "may be sub-
s~antially" in that form. "Substantially" is again another 
word that has been construed by the courts. In People ex 
rel. Darr v. Alton R. Co., (Ill.), 43 N.E. 2d 96-!, the court 
held "substantially the following form" did not require 
that notice of protest shou~d be in exact form as that 
prescribed in a statute, but 1neant only that notice should, 
in main, contain .all essential requirements of the form 
prescribed. "Substantial compliance" is a compliance 
in substance, not necessarily a literal, exact compliance. 
lrfartien v. Porter, 681\Iont. 450, 219 P. 817. 
The county auditor is required by Section 59-10-64 
( 4), U.C.A. 1953, to require payment of not only the 
taxes, penalties, interest and costs for the single ye.ar for 
which the sale is made, but also all other taxes, penalties, 
interest and costs for subsequent years which are a charge 
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11 
against the real estate being sold. A comparison of para-
graph ( 4) of Section 59-10-64 thus requiring sale for 
"an amount including all taxes assessed subsequently 
to the date of the preliminary sale" and of paragraph 
( 5) of the s.ame section which provides the substantial 
form for the tax deed and sets forth in that form provi-
sion for the one single year of the sale only, compels the 
conclusion that the amount paid to the auditor must of 
necessity be greater than the consideration provided to be 
recited in the form. 
There would appear to be no good reason in either 
law or logic why the exact consideration, either the full 
exact .amount of taxes, interest, costs and penalties for 
the first year or the full amount of all taxes and other 
items which are charged against the property, should 
by necessity be included on the face of the tax deed. There 
is no question but that the usual deed of conveyance 
whether warranty or quitclaim, need not recite the actual 
full consideration in dollars to be valid. The statute is 
clearly directory and gives only a suggested form, and 
failure to follow exactly that form should not prejudice 
the validity of the conveyance and the entire tax s.ale 
which it consummates. 
In any event, Section 59-10-64 in paragraph ( 5) there-
of makes the tax deed prima facie evidence of all pro-
ceedings subsequent to the preliminary sale, in this in-
stance, on January 10, 1950, .and of the conveyance of the 
property itself to the grantee. See 30 A.L.R. 8 and 88 
A.L.R. 264 citing cases upholding this prima facie evi-
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dence rule. The Appellants have complained that the 
deed fails to show on its face the payment of interest 
due on the 1949 taxes. However, the record fails to show 
that as a matter of fact all interest due was not paid. 
By their answers to the appellants' request for admissions 
of fact, the respondents admitted that the amounts of 
taxes and penalties for the years 1949 to 1953 inclusive, 
together with interest to l\1ay 13, 1954 amount to a total 
of $64.56 (Answer No. 6 dated December 23, 1954). (R. 
9). The respondents further admitted that the amount 
paid by them to the County Auditor or to the County 
Treasurer or both for the tax deed was not in excess of 
the sum of $64.56 (Answer No. 7 dated December 23, 
1954) (R. 9). This latter answer of the respondents was 
made in response to the request for admission of facts 
of the appellants which requested an adlnission that the 
amount paid by the respondents was in excess of the sun1 
of $64.27, which figure was corrected by the respondents 
in their answer to coincide with the total amount as 
actually due .and as admitted in their previous answer 
(Defendant's Request No. 7, dated December 16, 1954) 
(R. 5). 
Appellants have cited Wall v. J(aighn, 45 Utah 2-!4, 
144 P. 1100, as a case in point under Section 59-10-64, 
U.C.A. 1953, and quoted language from that decision. 
The Wall case involved an auditor's deed which recited 
facts which clearly indicated that the county itself was !l 
competitive bidder at its own sale and which failed to 
show an:· circu1nstances whereby the county could be a 
lawful pnrchaser. This was .a case decided in 1914 which 
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construed Sections 2621, 2623, and 2629, R.S. 1898, Comp. 
L. 1907. Many amendments and changes have been made 
in those sections since 1914, and Section 59-10-64, U.C.A. 
1953, here under consideration, was not in the law in its 
present form at the time of the Wall decision. 
In the instant tax deed there is nothing in its recitals 
which shows any irregularity in the tax sale. The statute, 
Sec. 59-10-64, U.C.A. 1953, calls for a showing on the 
deed of interest paid. The deed issued recited interest 
paid. (Ex. 1).• The other authority cited by appellants 
is Dreiling v. Colby, 170 Kan. 570, 228 P. 2d 504, wherein 
the Kansas court by dicta refers to a tax deed which 
failed to recite the data required by statute. The opinion 
in this case is of no help in construing our statute as it 
fails to show what requirement was lacking. The Kansas 
statute, however, appears by comparison to be mandatory 
as to its requirements regarding recitals to be contained 
in the tax deed by provision that "said deed shall recite 
-." (Italics ours.) Kansas G.S. 1935 79-2501. 
\ V e question the propriety of the expression "void 
on its face" as used by the appellants, who are .affected 
in no way by any variation in setting forth and itemizing 
the actual consideration paid, including interest. The 
tax debtor should not be permitted to benefit by such 
harmless variation in consideration recited (where .an 
intelligent adherence to two paragraphs of the same 
section, namely, 59-10-64 ( 4) and (5) require a variation) 
in avoiding an otherwise valid tax s.ale. We submit that 
the language of Section 59-10-64 and a logical interpreta-
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tion of that statute should call for a construction of the 
section as being directory only and not mandatory. 
POINT III. 
THE NOTI·CE PUBLISHED WITH THE DELINQUENT 
LIST CONTAINED NO EXCESSIVE DEMAND WHICH 
WOULD INVALIDATE THE SALE. 
Appellants argue that an excessive demand was made 
in the published delinquent list because of an alleged prac-
tice of the county treasurer in collecting a 25c advertising 
fee between December 1st and the following January 
lOth as claimed to be allowed (1) by reference thereto 
on the tax notice, or (2) because of an interpretation of 
the word "costs" in the delinquent list to be synonymous 
with "advertising fee." 
Respondents emphasize that the record of this case 
will not support the conclusions of the appellants as set 
forth in their Statement of Facts (App. Br. 4) that there 
was any established custom and practice for the County 
Treasurer to demand and collect an advertising fee in ad-
dition to the taxes and penalties. On the contrary the 
record does establish that there was no policy or practice 
in this regard (R. 18). 
The conduct of the County Treasurer in the prepara-
tion of both the tax notice and the delinquent list was en-
tirely in accord with statutory requiren1ents. Section 
59-10-10 and Section 59-10-29, U.C.A., 1953. 
Appellants rely chiefly on Fidelity Investment Co. 
v. S. L. County. 119 Utah -l-19, 228 P. 2d 278. That deci-
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sion w.as li1nited to finding the 25c advertising fee invalid 
during the 40 day period between December 1st and the 
following January lOth. There is no question but that 
after January lOth the 25c advertising fee was entirely 
valid and collectable. We submit that the Fidelity deci-
sion, supra, diluted the constructive demand by the 
County Treasurer in the tax notice. (We say constructive 
demand here, as it could only be constructive to a tax-
payer who did not receive a tax notice.) 
The dmnand of the county treasurer as authorized 
by statute was part of the law of which every taxp.ayer 
was presumed to know and which subject thereto he held 
his property. Closson v. Closson, 30 Wyo. 1, 215 P. 485, 
29 A.L.R. 1371; North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 
268 U.S. 276, 69 L. Ed. 953, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 491. That 
demand made by the County Treasurer pursuant to stat-
ute was tempered by the construction placed on it by the 
Fidelity decision, supra. Case law is a part of the whole 
body of the law of the land to which the presumption of 
knowledge thereof applies equally with statutory law. 
Spitzer v. Board of Trustees (C.C.A. Ohio), 267 F. 121, 
126. 
Thus the taxpayer had the benefit of the Fidelity 
decision, supra, and any demand made by the County 
Treasurer in the delinquent list notice, and also on the 
tax notice itself, was the legal demand as required by 
statute as limited by the Fidelity case. Any constructive 
demand made by the County Treasurer was only that 
which he legally could make, namely for an advertising 
fee after January lOth. 
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Appellants' alleged demand to the taxpayer is the 
published delinquent list. Section 59-10-29, U.C.A 1953, 
provides that the delinquent list shall show: 
"«' * * the amount of the taxes due, exclusive 
of penalty. The county treasurer must publish 
with such list a notice that unless the delinquent 
taxes, together with the penalty, are paid before 
the lOth day of January, or if such date falls on 
Sunday or a legal holiday, then the 11th day of 
January, the real property upon which such taxes 
are a lien, excepting only such property as is held 
by the county under a prior preliminary tax sale, 
will be sold for taxes, penalty and costs on said 
date." (Italics ours.) 
Appellants' .argument requires that the "costs" re-
ferred to in this section of necessity mean exclusively 
the advertising fee. l\1anifestly this interpretation is not 
justified, as the statute fails to separately itemize inter-
est, which is a valid charge and which of necessity must 
be included within the scope of "costs." The most serious 
charge that .appellants could make against the form of 
the delinquent list notice is that the term "costs" is not 
precisely defined. 
Section 59-10-29, U.C.A. 1953, supra, requires the 
setting forth of several items, including the amount of 
the original tax. \Ve respectfully submit that each of the 
authorities cited by appellants on pages 17 to 20 of their 
Brief are authorities concerned with the effect of incor-
rectly published amounts due and are not concerned 
with any definition of •'costs" as included in our statute. 
\Ve emphasize that the record here shows no error in 
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the "amount of taxes due, exclusive of penalties" as set 
forth in the instant tax notice and delinquent list notice. 
There is no question raised by appellants as to the 
validity of any demand made after January lOth. We 
contend that the effect of the Fidelity case, supra, on the 
tax notice and the delinquent list notice, together with 
a reasonable and logical construction of the delinquent 
notice, will not support any finding of an unlawful de-
mand prior to January lOth. 
POINT IV. 
THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER OF TENDER HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO THIS SITUATION. WAIVER OF TENDER 
REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT. 
The .appellants' fourth contention is that the tax title 
should fail as the County Treasurer had made an un-
authorized demand upon the taxpayers, and that had the 
taxpayer made a tender of the authorized amount it would 
not have been accepted by the treasurer, and that such 
tender is therefore waived. 
Appellants' argument assumes : 
(1) An actual demand on the taxpayer. 
(2) A definite policy on the part of the County 
Treasurer not to accept payment of taxes without the 
25c advertising fee. Each of these assumptions is un-
warranted. 
The appellants admitted by their answers to inter-
rogatories that they did not receive any tax notice for 
the year 1949 or for subsequent years; that they made no 
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inquiry of the County officials, their grantors or the 
mortgagee holding a mortgage upon the real property 
as to why tax notices were not received. (See interroga-
tories Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 25 (R. 21-22) and .answers 
thereto (R. 29, 33) ). 
The only reference 1n the record to any policy or 
lack of policy on the part of the County Treasurer as to 
the acceptance of the payment of the taxes and penalties 
without inclusion of the 25c advertising fee is admission 
No. 5 of Respondents (R. 18) wherein an interview with 
former county officials was reported. Those officials 
recalled only one instance of such a tender and that by 
Mr. Gatrell, attorney for appellants. \Ve submit that 
one limited actual tender did not establish a course of 
conduct or a firm policy. 
Appellants then argue that if the two assumptions 
of fact above made by them are true then any tender 
is w.aived automatically, as it is assumed to be a useless 
act. 
In the Fidelity case, supra, as in Gatrell v. Salt Lak~ 
Co~tnty, Dist. Ct. No. 96625, referred to by appellants in 
their brief, there was an actual tender of the mnount 
owing on taxes, less the 25c advertising fee during the 
forty day period. The tender w.as kept good by the pay-
lnent into court of the amounts actually tendered. Re-
spondents stress that in the instant case no tender was 
1nade and that in fact the taxpayer by his own admissions 
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did not have in mind at .any time material to this action 
the necessity of paying, indeed, even the intention of in-
quiring into, these taxes (R. 21, 22, 29, 33). 
We do not quarrel with the decision of the Fidelity 
case, supra, nor do we quarrel with the fundamental gen-
eral rule of law that a tender of an amount lawfully owing 
will discharge the elaim, provided the obligee has manifest 
a clear intention that the amount will not be accepted. 
However, we submit that the law of tender and waiver 
of tender as discharging an obligation must be strictly 
limited to cases of intentional contractual relationship 
between parties dealing with full knowledge of the ma-
terial facts involved. The tendering of an obligation 
and likewise the waiver of such tender is a volitional 
type of activity and is not an automatic result that comes 
about from unconscious activity. Here the appellants are 
in effect saying that the taxpayers are prejudiced because 
if they had received a demand and if they had made the 
tender, the amount would not have been accepted. Where 
either of these two suppositions does not in fact material-
ize, this argument must fail as not falling within the 
doctrine of waiver of tender. We submit that it is not 
enough that someone else (.and we emphasize that this 
record and appellants' brief shows that no one other than 
Mr. Gatrell himself had ever made such tender and been 
refused) has made such tender; that this is not enough 
to discharge the tax obligation of other taxp.ayers in 
complete ignorance of Gatrell's completely isolated ten-
der. 
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The law seems to universally support the principle 
that no waiver of tender exists where the creditor is not 
given actual knowledge of the proposed tender and given 
an opportunity to object. See 52 Am. Jur. 217. A tender 
and a waiver of tender both presuppose actual knowledge 
in the contracting parties of the demand and the futility 
of the tender. If there is no knowledge of either the 
tender or the futility of payment, there can be no waiver. 
In Re Auerbach's Estate, 23 Utah 529, 65 P. 488, 
our Supreme Court stated: 
"A waiver is the relinquishment or refusal to 
accept of a right. It is effective only when it is 
made intentionally and with knowledge of the 
circumstances." 
The Auerbach case cites for its authority for this 
statement Bennecke v. Insurance Co., 105 U.S. 355, 26 
L. Ed. 290. 
In Reed v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 21 Utah 295, 
61 P. 21, our Supreme Court again referred to the Ben-
necke case and again held that a waiver is an intentional 
relinquishment of .a known right and that there n1ust be 
both knowledge of the right and an intention to relinquish 
it. 
We quote from Dexter v. Sexton, 43 X.Y.S.171: 
"Waiver is intentional, not accidental. \Yaiver 
must be by one in possession of full knowledge 
and with the intent to waive." 
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We sub1nit that in this case any claim for support of 
waiver of tender must be founded upon an accidental 
or unconscious waiver of tender. In the c.ases of Mundt 
v. J.llallon, 106 ~Iont. 422, 76 P. 2d 326, and Freedman v. 
Fire Ins. Assn., 168 Penn. 249, it has been held that waiver 
is essentially a matter of intention and cannot arise out 
of acts done in ignorance. In Santina v. General Ameri-
can Ins. Co., 54 Nev. 127, 9 P. 2d 1000, the court held that 
"knowledge is the essential element of waiver." In Jewell 
c. Jewell (Maine) 24 Atl. 84, the court said: "A waiver 
involves assent and is primarily an act of the under-
standing." (Italics ours.) In Hollander v. Heaslip, 222 
Fed. 808, the court held : 
''A waiver exists only where one with full 
knowledge does or forbears to do something in-
consistent with a right or with his intention to rely 
on that right." 
\Ve submit that the tender of the delinquent taxes 
less the 25c advertising fee in the Fidelity case, supra, 
and the Gatrell case, supra, should not be given the un-
reasonable effect of discharging the tax liens of all tax-
payers without any conscious efforts on their parts. 
We feel that to extend the holding of the Fidelity c.ase, 
supra, is an unreasonable protection of the rights of a 
taxpayer who has a period approximating five years be-
fore sale or after delinquency during which to pay a law-
ful tax on real estate by his claiming that for a period 
approximating three weeks he would have paid an un-
lawful tax to the extent of 25 cents, h.ad it occurred to 
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him to make redemption during that interval. As a practi-
cal matter the forty day period is cut in half because the 
County Treasurer's office is closed to all payments for 
about three weeks after November 30th for preparation 
of the delinquent list. 
Appellants have cited the cases of Thomas v. John-
son, 55 Utah 424, 186 P. 437, and H.O.L.C. v. Washington, 
119 Utah 469, 161 P. 2d 355. These are both c.ases wher3 
the creditor exercised an affirmative repudiation of the 
amount actually sought to be tendered by the debtor. 
These cases are not in point here where the parties who 
could have made a tender by their admissions stated that 
they never had any such idea or intention (R. 21, 22, 29, 
33). 
After January 10, 1950 and until the property was 
sold at the May s.ale in 1954 a 25c charge was entirely 
proper, as the Fidelity case, supra, would necessarily 
infer. Appellants would give all taxpayers an oppor-
tunity to defeat every tax title by use of an obscure 
technicality that existed only for a short period of the 
lengthy time required to consummate the tax s.ale and 
where the taxpayers admittedly had no intention of mak-
ing any tender to take advantage of such technicality. 
We submit this would be allowing the taxpayer to 
upset and ineffectuate the entire taxing system .and would 
make absolutely impossible the perfection of any market-
able tax title, absent the question of limitations. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants' objections to this tax title in their 4 sepa-
rate points apply largely to all tax titles. The objections 
covered in their Points II, III .and IV could be objections 
to every tax title in the State of Utah, and the theory 
for which appellants argue in their Point I could likewise 
create an objection in many tax titles besides that now 
before this court. 
Respondents submit that to uphold the claimed de-
fects because of the attacks herein brought, or any of 
them, is to declare the impossibility of protecting our 
gener.al taxing authority's power to enforce payment of 
general taxes by the methods intended. Absent questions 
of limitations, the tax title purchaser would be forever 
frustrated in perfecting a marketable title. 
\Ve respectfully submit that the argued objections of 
the appellants are at best trivial, immaterial and in no 
w.ay affected appellants or their rights in the property 
taxed. \V e emphasize the overriding principle that the 
power of the taxing authority to function must be sus-
tained; that the rights of the taxpayers must be fully 
protected, but that as in the language of the United States 
Supreme Court in Pillow v. Roberts, 13 Howard 472, 14 
L. Ed. 228, 230 : 
"The power of the legislature to make the 
deed of a public officer prima f.acie evidence of 
the regularity of the previous proceedings, cannot 
be doubted. And the owner who neglects or re-
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fuses to pay his ta.xes, or redeem his land, has no 
right to complain of its injustice. If he has paid 
his taxes, or redeemed his land, he is, no doubt, 
at liberty to prove it, and thus annul the sale. If 
he has not, he has no right to complain if he suf-
fers the legal consequences of his own neglect." 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed, 
appellants to pay the costs incurred in connection with 
this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES W. BELESS, JR. 
LEWIS S. LIVINGSTON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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